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Abstract— This paper analyses EU dairy policy 
reforms and mainly focus on EU milk quota removal 
scenarios. The model used to evaluate the scenario is a 
spatial equilibrium model of the dairy sector. It 
integrates the main competitor of the EU on world 
markets, Oceania, as well as the main importing regions 
in the rest of the world. The paper first assesses the 
impact of the Luxembourg scenario in the prospect of a 
new WTO agreement in the future. It then provide a 
quantitative assessment of the impact of the abolition of 
EU milk quotas on the EU dairy sector either through a 
gradual phasing out or through an abrupt abolition of 
milk quotas. Compared to a status-quo policy, the 
Luxembourg policy leads to a 7.6 percent milk price 
decrease and a 1.9 percent milk production increase. A 
gradual increase of milk quotas as recently proposed by 
the European Commission  (+ 7% over 6 years) generate 
a 9% drop in the EU milk price (compared to the 
Luxembourg scenario) and an increase in production by 
3.5%. A complete elimination of quotas leads to an 
additional 1% increase in production and an additional 
3% drop in the EU milk price. As compared to the 
baseline scenario, in the Luxembourg scenario in 2014-
15, producers gain 1.3 billion €, whereas in the same year 
they lose 2.6 billion € in the soft landing scenario. As 
such the direct payments are more than sufficient to 
compensate producers for the loss of producer surplus in 
the Luxembourg scenario, but fall short to achieve full 
compensation in the soft landing scenario. 
Keywords— milk quota, policy reform, soft and hard 
landing. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The EU dairy policy has undergone several changes 
over the last 30 years. The most significant of these 
changes were the introduction of the milk quotas in 
1984, and more recently the 2003 CAP reform 
(Luxembourg Agreement). The Luxembourg 
Agreement not only deepened the reform of the 1990s, 
but further completed it by including the dairy sector, 
as well as by decoupling the direct payments from 
production. As regards dairy it implied significant 
declines in support prices for butter and skimmed milk 
powder as well as significant reductions in the 
intervention purchases. As a result the intervention 
prices no longer act as strict floor prices. These price 
cuts are partly compensated for by newly introduced 
milk premiums. The milk quota regime was prolonged 
till 2014-15. In the upcoming evaluation of the CAP 
(Health Check in 2008) the future of the quota regime 
will be at the core of the discussions. Many countries 
are now in favour of an expiry of the quota regime. 
Milk production quotas were increased by 2% in April 
2008, and the European Commission has proposed to 
increase them by 1 percent per annum from 2009 to 
2013.  
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of alternative 
scenarios of dairy policy. Namely, we analyze the 
Luxembourg reform, the recent EC proposal (soft 
landing) and a hard landing scenario.  
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis of dairy policy reforms relies on the 
integrated use of a model which takes into account the 
whole dairy chain, starting upstream from primary 
milk production and ending downstream with 
consumer demand for processed dairy products. At the 
primary supply level the model takes into account that 
milk is produced using a dairy cow herd, (compound) 
feed and roughage feed, among which grass from 
pasture land. The primary supply model also 
recognizes that milk and beef might be jointly 
produced and also takes into account beef output. The 
supply model also takes overtime improvements in 
milk yields into account. On average over the period 
2008-2020, milk yields (autonomously) increase by 
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1.03% and 1.21% per annum for the EU15 and EU10 
respectively. These yield increases, which vary over 
countries, are based on empirical estimates. As regards 
the policy side, the milk quota policy is taken into 
account with respect to national quota levels and fat 
correction to deal with actual fat composition of milk.  
In case of binding milk quota this implies that an 
estimate of the value of the quota rent has to be used 
(see more detailed discussion below). Also the direct 
payments received by dairy producers, which are 
considered to be fully decoupled, are accounted for. 
To deal with the downstream part of the dairy 
chain, a processing model is used, which consists of a 
partial equilibrium model of the dairy sector. It has two 
key features. First, it is a hedonic model that explicitly 
models the processing technology of milk into final 
commodities. Milk is valued through the value of its 
two main components (fat and protein) in the final 
dairy commodities and the underlying technology is 
consistent with milk availability (quantity of 
components used in the process of final commodities 
cannot exceed the available quantities of milk 
components). Second, the model is spatial and is 
disaggregated at the country level, which allows for 
the modelling of trade between countries. As regards 
the policy side, the main instruments used to support 
milk prices are integrated (intervention prices, 
domestic and exports subsidies, import policy).  
Formally, we denote I1 the subset of producing and 
exporting regions (EU, Oceania) and I2 the subset of 
importing regions (Asia, Africa and Middle East, 
America, CIS and rest of Europe). The inverse supply 
function for milk in region i ( 1Ii∈ ) is denoted 
)( ii XS  with iX the quantity of milk collected. 
Because milk is a bulk product, we do not allow trade 
of raw milk between regions. We denote kiY ,  the 
production of the processed commodity k in region i. 
Production of commodity k involves different 
components that are an integral part of raw milk and 
that are “rearranged” and allocated among processed 
commodities. We denote si,α  the quantity of the sth 
component per unit of raw milk produced in region i 
and sk ,γ  the quantity of the sth component per unit of 
processed commodity k. Under a Leontief technology, 
the transformation of raw milk into processed 
commodities must satisfy: 
 
sIiXY siik skki ,1,,, ∈∀≤∑ αγ   (1) 
 
Equation (1) ensures the balance in the allocation of 
component s in each producing region i. In addition to 
milk components, the production of commodity k also 
involves labour and capital inputs, which are provided 
at a marginal cost function , ,( )i k i kc Y .  
The inverse demand function for each final 
commodity k in region i is denoted by )( ,, kiki ZD  
where kiZ ,  denotes the consumption of commodity k 
in region i.  
Trade across regions involves transportation cost. 
We assume a constant marginal cost for transportation 
of commodity k from region i to region j and denote it 
kjit ,, . Trade flows, denoted by impexkjiXD ,,,, , represent 
the quantity of commodity k that is transported from 
region i to region j under the export regime ex (of 
region i) and under the import regime imp (of region j). 
We distinguish subsidized exports (ex = “sub”) from 
non subsidized exports (ex = “nsub”). The per-unit 
export subsidy for commodity k is denoted by exkES , . 
Obviously, kES nsubk ∀= ,0"", . On the import side we 
consider import tariffs and tariff rate quota (TRQ). 
TRQs are modelled as an import quota associated with 
a low tariff (imp=“min”) and over quota imports 
associated with a higher tariff (imp=“ovq”). We also 
consider the case where no tariff prevails (imp=“no”). 
The per-unit import tariff for commodity k is denoted 
by impkIT , . Obviously, kIT nok ∀= ,0"", . Finally, note 
that "","",,, nonsubkiiXD  is the quantity of commodity k 
that is both produced and consumed in the same region 
i. The trade flow constraints across regions are: 
 
kIiYXD kiimpexj impexkji ∀∈∀≤∑ ,1,,, ,,,,  (2) 
kiXDZ
impexj impexkijki
,
,, ,,,,,
∀≤∑  (3) 
 
In any region, these equations guarantee that exports 
plus domestic use cannot be larger than domestic 
production (equation 2), and that domestic 
consumption cannot exceed domestic production plus 
imports (equation 3).  
 3 
12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
We integrate the full set of EU dairy policy 
instruments. The milk quota constraint is written as:  
 
 """" EUEU XX ≤ .   (4) 
The constraint on the volume of subsidized exports1 
is written as: 
 kEXXD kEUimpEUj impsubkjEU ∀≤∑ ≠ ,"","" ,"",,,""  
        (5) 
 
On the import side, the TRQ is written as: 
k,jIXXD k,jex,ji min"",ex,k,j,i ∀≤∑ ≠   (6) 
where ,j kXI  denotes the tariff rate quota associated to 
commodity k in the the jth country. 
 
As a basis for representing resource allocation, 
we consider the following optimization problem: 
 
, , , , , ,
,
, , , , , , , , ,
, , ,0 0
, ,
, , , , , , , ,
, , , ,
( , , , )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i i k i k i j k ex imp
i k i
X Y Z XD i i k i k i j k ex imp
Z X
i k i i k i k
i k i i k
i j k k ex k imp i j k ex imp
i j k ex imp
Max QW X Y Z XD
D u du S u du c Y
t ES IT XD
=
− − −
− +
∑ ∑ ∑∫ ∫
∑
        (7) 
 
Subject to (1)-(6), 
0,0,0,0 ,,,,,, ≥≥≥≥ impexkjikikii XDZYX . 
 
The quasi-welfare function (7) is equal to the sum of 
producer and consumer surpluses across all regions 
minus the total cost of labour and capital in the 
processing sector minus the total cost of transportation. 
The solution to (7) can be shown to generate a 
competitive resource allocation (see Chavas et al. [1]). 
We derive the equilibrium on: 
• the milk market in producing and exporting 
regions: production, price (country level); 
                                                          
1. In this setting, we assume that constraints on subsidized exports 
apply for each product (as it is the case for butter or SMP). In 
practice, some constraints apply for a group of products (cheese 
for example or other dairy products). To take this into account in 
the empirical model, we define constraints that apply for a group 
of products rather than individual products.  
• the intermediate products markets: fat and protein 
prices (country level); 
• the dairy products markets: production, price, 
subsidized and unsubsidized consumption 
(country level); 
• trade: imports, subsidised exports, unsubsidised 
exports. 
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The spatial equilibrium model of the world dairy 
industry gives a complete picture of the EU-25 dairy 
sector as well as its trade relationships with the main 
importing or exporting areas in the world. We provide 
in Table 1 a list of the parameters of the model, the list 
of policy variables that affect the results (a full set of 
these policy variables composes a 'scenario') and a list 
of the outputs of the results of the model.   
A. Product, country and period coverage 
The applied model integrates an agricultural product 
(cow milk), 2 milk components (fat and protein), and 
14 final dairy products (butter, skim milk powder, 
whole milk powder, condensed milk, casein, liquid 
milk, cream, fresh products and five categories of 
cheese: fresh, semi hard, hard, processed, blue and soft 
cheese).  
Three groups of countries are modelled: EU25, 
Oceania and importing regions (Asia, Africa and 
Middle East, America, CIS and rest of Europe).  
• EU: the model included each of the 15 Member 
States (with Belgium and Luxembourg being 
aggregated). It has been enlarged to the 10 New 
Member States. Among them, the three main 
producers (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) 
are explicitly introduced and the seven other 
countries are considered as an aggregate. These 
countries are Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia. All of the 25 
European Union regions are considered both as a 
supplier of milk and dairy products and as a 
demanding region for dairy commodities. They can 
trade among each other or with the rest of the 
world. 
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Table 1: List of the main parameters, policy variables and outputs of the dairy industry model 
 
• Oceania: because Oceania is the main exporter of 
dairy products in the world, the model includes 
Oceania as an exporting zone. Oceania is modelled 
as a supplying region only. It produces milk and 
processes it into dairy commodities that are then 
exported on world markets. The domestic 
consumption in Oceania is assumed to be price 
inelastic. The exports are thus the difference 
between production and a fixed consumption. We 
thus consider that the 25 European Union countries 
compete on international markets with another 
exporting region, Oceania (New Zealand and 
Australia). Note finally, that Oceania can export to 
the EU.  
 
 
 
 
 
• Importing countries: the four importing 
regions that are distinguished are the main importers 
of EU-25 and Oceania’s products, which are: CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) and the rest of 
Europe (including Turkey), Asia, Africa and Middle 
East countries, and America. For each importer, we 
model import demand functions based on estimated 
import demand elasticities (Hadj Ali-Kein and 
Soregaroli [2]). 
 
The model is multi-periodic and takes into account 
year by year changes in demand conditions (change in 
the demand due to non price effects such as income 
changes, taste changes, etc.) and in supply conditions 
(technological changes). The model includes trends in 
demand that were estimated using historical data on 
consumption (over a long period, about 30 years 
 Countries Parameters Policy Variables Results 
R
A
W
 M
IL
K
 
    
EU25 regions Elasticity of 
supply 
Quotas Milk production  
Oceania Lagged 
adjustments 
Decoupled payments Milk price 
 Quota rents  Price of components 
 Technological 
progress 
  
 Fat and protein 
content 
  
FI
N
A
L 
PR
O
D
U
C
TS
 
    
EU25 regions Processing costs Production subsidies (casein) Production  
Oceania Fat and Protein 
composition 
Intervention price Consumption 
 Demand function 
(subsidised and 
non subsidised) 
Consumption subsidies (butter, 
SMP) 
Prices 
T
R
A
D
E 
    
EU25 regions Transportation 
costs 
Subsidized Export constraints EU intra trade 
Oceania Import demand 
functions 
(RoW) 
Import access commitments EU exports to RoW 
RoW regions  Import tariffs EU imports 
  Export subsidies (EU) Oceania exports 
  RoW imports 
  World prices 
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depending on countries and products) which are used 
as shifters of the demand function for each dairy 
product in each country or group of countries. This is 
needed to analyse market conditions over the 
simulation period (till 2014-15). A specific work was 
devoted to the estimates of autonomous demand trend 
that can be found in Bouamra Mechemache et al. [3]. 
The aggregate annual average trend is estimated to be 
0.2% in fat equivalent and 0.5% in protein equivalent. 
For new member countries, autonomous trend 
estimates are not available; we thus had to make some 
assumptions. For importing countries in the rest of the 
world, we assume an autonomous demand trend of 2% 
percent per year. The model also incorporates a 
dynamic element in the supply side. The milk supply 
curve of a given year for each EU member country 
depends on past prices and cow stocks. For Oceania, a 
technical rate of progress of 1% per year is assumed. 
 
B. Domestic and Trade policies 
The following domestic policy instruments are 
taken into account: 
• Price support : Minimum price for Skimmed Milk 
Powder (SMP) and butter, consumption subsidies 
for SMP and butter, production subsidies for 
casein; 
• Direct payments: decoupled payments;  
• Supply control: Production quotas including the fat 
correction element; 
• Milk premium (decoupled), Beef premium (might 
be partly coupled); 
• Estimated single farm payment (SFP) or single area 
payment (SAP) at the sector level. 
 
Trade policies (export and import policies) are 
modelled for EU25 member countries as well as for 
importing regions in the rest of the world. Both export 
and import policies are modelled for EU25. We 
consider that EU25 countries benefit from exports 
subsidies up to the limit imposed by the WTO. Per-
unit export subsidies are differentiated according to 
the importing area. We implement minimum and 
current access quotas as well as the corresponding 
tariffs and over quota tariffs. Trade within the EU-25 
is unrestricted.  
In our modelling, domestic and export subsidies are 
endogenously determined. Then changes in the 
intervention prices (and in quotas) will affect domestic 
and export subsidies. However, there is no 
commitment on their level. They are rather adjusted 
each year to take into account market conditions. They 
are set in order to make the domestic price of butter 
and SMP as close as possible to the intervention price. 
As long as subsidies are authorized, two situations can 
arise at the equilibrium. In the first one, the domestic 
price of butter (SMP) is equal to the intervention price. 
This means that there exist some positive subsidies 
which are given to fat products (protein products) in 
order to sustain the demand. In the second situation, 
the domestic price of butter (SMP) is greater than the 
intervention price. This corresponds to the situation 
where all subsidies given to fat products (protein 
products) are set to zero. However, the demand is 
sufficient to maintain domestic prices greater than the 
intervention price.   
The model also includes trade policy for Africa, 
America, Asia and the rest of Europe. As we model 
only the demand for imports from these regions (net 
imports demand), we only integrate the import policy 
in the model. Over quota tariffs are implemented. We 
model the tariff rate quota for cheese in America. 
C. Quotas and marginal costs 
For each EU25 region, we use a linear milk supply 
function which is a simplified form of a more 
sophisticated milk supply model developed by 
Jongeneel and Ponsioen [4], Jongeneel and Tonini [5]. 
The simplified milk supply equation that is used in the 
model corresponds to a long-run supply equation. For 
EU-15 member state countries, due to the existence of 
a quota system since 1981, estimating the supply 
function was difficult. In particular, the supply curve 
depends on the level of quota rents in each EU15 
member country.  
To highlight the main characteristics of the milk quota 
policy as it is functioning at member state level, we 
provide in Table 2 a number of characteristics of dairy 
sector. Based on this table, the following observations 
can be made. First, member states are differing with 
respect to farm structure and possibilities to benefit 
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from economies of scale. Second, most EU15 Member 
States have a regime of free quota trade. Sometimes 
hybrids of free and regulated trade or exchanges are in 
place. Trade limitations could provide an explanation 
for structural under production, whereas it seems 
reasonable to assume still binding quota at the country 
as a whole. Third, countries facing binding quota are 
expected to show a valuation of quota rights which is 
significantly different from zero. Information provided 
in table 2 should be interpreted in an indicative way. 
Where prices are significantly above zero this signals 
binding quota. When quota prices are close to zero 
(like for example for Sweden and United Kingdom) 
this indicates that those countries might be on the edge 
or even under producing as compared to the available 
reference quota amount. As regards the new Member 
States, non-zero quota values were observed for Czech 
Republic, Poland and Latvia. They signal binding 
quota for these countries, whereas most other new 
Member States are likely to under produce. Fourth, 
several countries apply regional restrictions to quota 
tradability, which might be a source of inefficient 
allocation. It can even explain why some countries 
might under produce (for example due to below-quota 
production in inefficient and disadvantaged regions), 
whereas at the same time the more productive regions 
in such a country face binding quota and non-zero 
quota prices. When looking further back in time, it can 
be observed that regional restrictions tend to be 
relaxed over time (e.g. Germany). 
The other key element of milk supply is the initial 
quota rent which determines the value of the shadow 
milk price (marginal costs) in the initial year. Some 
econometric estimates of marginal costs exist in the 
EU (see Wieck [6], Moro et al. [7], Cathagne et al. 
[8]). As the model covers all EU member states, a full 
set of marginal costs estimates is required. The set of 
estimates from Moro et al. and Sckokaï [9] is used in 
the present analysis. Rather than relying on aggregate 
time series estimates, these estimates for the EU-15 
were based on a detailed micro-analysis using FADN 
data. Thus the same methodology was applied to each 
EU member state. Since in recent years in Sweden and 
UK the quota is no longer binding (while there is 
quota trade among producers) for these member states 
the milk supply relationship was further adjusted to 
reflect quota rents equal to zero (or equivalently 
marginal costs being equal to the base year’s milk 
price).  
Because quota rents are a key parameter of the 
analysis two sets of estimates from the above studies 
were selected. The estimates of long-run marginal 
costs which could be considered as upper bounds of 
marginal costs are used as a standard assumption. As 
an alternative for the sensitivity analysis, their 
medium-run marginal costs are used. Estimates of 
medium marginal costs integrate all variable inputs 
plus the cost of hired labour and costs of cow stocks 
and machinery and building investments. Long run 
marginal costs include all these costs plus the cost of 
land.  
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Table 2:  Member State specific information about milk production, quota (without land) re-allocation mechanism, and quota valuation 
Country Belgium Denmark Germany Greece 
Production / quota At quota level At quota level Over production Under production 
#dairy cows/holding 35 75 36 14 
Quota trade 
 
Regulated and free trade 
(within family and potential 
siphon of 40%) 
Regulated Trade (Exchange System) ;  
since 2001 a 1% siphon 
Regulated  trade (Exchange 
System) system 
Free Trade ( 5% siphon) 
Quota price €0.37/kg (regulated); €0.42/kg- €0.62/kg €0.30/kg – €0.70/kg Unknown 
Regional restrictions to 
quota re-allocation 
Yes - 2 regions from 2007 No 
Modeling choice Binding quota Binding quota Binding quota and structural 
overproduction 
Binding quota and structural 
underproduction 
     
Country Spain France Finland Ireland 
Production /quota At quota level Under production At quota level At quota level 
#dairy cows/holding 18 36 18 42 
Quota trade 
 
Regulated trade Regulated trade  Free trade and regulated trade; 
tax deduction for buyer 
Regulated trade (Exchange 
system)  
(30% siphon for priority pool) 
Quota price 
 
€0.27/kg €0.15/kg €0.28/kg (free trade); 
€0.04/kg (regulated) 
Range from €0.10 to 0.28€kg  
(priority pool price 12 cent);  
Regional restrictions to 
quota re-allocation 
Yes Yes Yes, 7 regions Yes, transfers restricted to 
purchaser areas 
Modeling choice Binding quota Binding quota and structural 
underproduction 
Binding quota Binding quota 
      
Country Italy Netherlands Austria Portugal Sweden 
Production / quota Over production At quota level Over production At quota level Under production 
# dairy cows/holding 25 54 9 15 41 
Quota trade 
 
Free trade Free trade; tax deduction for 
buyer 
Free trade Free trade, but 7.5% 
siphon reduction  
Free trade; tax deduction 
for buyer 
Quota price €0.35/kg (high productive region) €0.70/kg €0.50-0.70/kg €0.24/kg – €0.35/kg €0.07/kg -€0.20/kg 
Regional restrictions to 
quota re-allocation 
Yes, no transfer from mountains, or 
LFA  to plains 
No No Yes, no transfer from 
vulnerable to non-
vulnerable regions 
Yes, 2 regions 
Modeling choice 
 
Binding quota and structural over 
production 
Binding quota Binding quota and 
structural over production 
Binding quota Non-binding quota 
     
Country United Kingdom Czech Republic Hungary Poland Other 7 NMS 
Production / quota Under production Under production Under production Over production Under production 
# dairy cows/holding 80 42 14 4 - 
Quota trade 
 
Free trade Free trade Free Trade  Free trade;  Lithuania: auction; 
Estonia: quota traded with 
cows; Latvia: free trade. 
Quota price €0.02/kg - €0.05/kg €0.07/kg €0.07/kg - €0.15/kg Latvia €0.10/kg 
Regional restrictions to 
quota re-allocation 
No, except a small one 
for some Scottish islands 
No No- Yes, 16 regions No for Lithuania, Estonia 
and Latvia 
Modeling choice Non binding quota Non binding quota Non-binding quota Binding quota and 
structural over production 
Non-binding quota 
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Table 3: Actual milk price and marginal cost (€/kg, 2000)2 
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of quota rents (in % of milk price) 
  BL DK DE GR 
Inra Wageningen 2002 32% 42% 45% 37% 
Lips and Rieder 2005 20% 26% 20% 0% 
This study 31% 11% 18% 1% 
  ES FR IE IT 
Inra Wageningen 2002 38% 35% 49% 37% 
Lips and Rieder 2005 24% 22% 31% 23% 
This study 30% 17% 25% 22% 
  NL AT PT FI 
Inra Wageningen 2002 36% 46% 27% 24% 
Lips and Rieder 2005 23% 17% 0% 15% 
This study 36% 36% 0% 22% 
  SE UK EU15  
Inra Wageningen 2002 15% 43% 39%  
Lips and Rieder 2005 10% 27% 22%  
This study 11% 22% 21%  
EU15: weighted average, Sweden and UK non corrected 
 
                                                          
2 Marginal costs estimates and farm milk price from Sckokaï [9] using 
FADN data.  Not included correction to Sweden and UK marginal costs 
which amount to 0.030 and 0.058 euro/kg respectively. 
Table 3 summarizes the best-estimates for the 
year 2000 and shows the marginal cost estimates for 
both the medium and long-run. As Table 3 shows, in 
EU15 member states, the medium-run marginal 
costs range from 50 to 70% of the farm milk price 
while long-run marginal costs are approximately 20 
to 30% higher than medium-run marginal costs. The 
long run marginal cost estimates reported in Table 3 
are on average very similar to the ones used by Lips 
and Rieder [10]: our long run marginal costs are 81 
percent of the milk price compared to 82 percent in 
Lips and Rieder (cf. Table 4 where estimates from 
Lips and Rieder [10] and Inra Wageningen [11]). 
Whereas the average marginal cost or quota rent 
estimates are rather similar, estimates for individual 
countries might substantially deviate from each 
other.  
IV. BASELINE AND SCENARIOS 
The baseline for the analysis of policy reform 
scenarios (Baseline) represents a continuation of the 
pré-Luxembourg agreement situation, including the 
1995 Uruguay Round trade agreement. It thus 
represents a status-quo situation where the dairy 
policy implemented is the one in place in 2003.3 
Three scenarios are analysed and compared to the 
baseline. 
- Luxembourg: it is the policy as defined in 2003 
(Luxemburg agreement). It implies a stepwise 
reduction of SMP and butter intervention prices by 
15 and 25 percent respectively. The milk quota are 
gradually increased in the period 2006-07 – 2008-
09 increasing the total EU-25 quota by 1.1 percent 
to 136 million tons. Direct payments are 
progressively introduced reaching 35.5 €/t in EU15 
countries and 24.85 €/t in EU10 countries in 2010-
11. In addition to the Luxembourg agreement, we 
assume that a new WTO agreement is signed on 
the basis of the Falconer proposal of autumn 2007. 
It consists of a reduction of the import tariffs, an 
increase in import quotas and a complete 
elimination of export subsidies. The changes are 
progressively introduced over a 6 year period 
(2009-10 to 2014-15).  
                                                          
3 To simplify the analysis and the comparison of scenarios, EU10 
countries are modelled as if they were part of the EU in 2003. 
  BL DK DE GR ES 
Milk price 0.286 0.338 0.309 0.315 0.274 
Medium run marginal cost 0.156 0.228 0.169 0.232 0.147 
Long run marginal cost 0.197 0.301 0.252 0.313 0.193 
LRMC in % of milk price 69% 89% 82% 99% 70% 
  FR IE IT NL AT 
Milk price 0.310 0.284 0.393 0.322 0.300 
Medium run marginal cost 0.195 0.162 0.261 0.178 0.169 
Long run marginal cost 0.257 0.213 0.306 0.206 0.193 
LR MC in % of milk price 83% 75% 78% 64% 64% 
  PT FI SE UK  
Milk price 0.249 0.333 0.343 0.292  
Medium run marginal cost 0.228 0.219 0.270 0.163  
Long run marginal cost 0.281 0.261 0.304 0.227  
LRMC in % of milk price 113% 78% 89% 78%  
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- Soft Landing: the design of the soft landing 
scenario follows the recent proposition of the 
European Commission with a 2 percent increase in 
milk quotas in 2008 followed by a further quota 
increase by 1 percent per annum from 2009 to 
2013. All other elements of the domestic and trade 
dairy policies are those assumed in the 
Luxembourg scenario. In particular, a WTO 
agreement is introduced over a 6 year period.  
-  Hard Landing: Rather than gradually increasing 
milk quotas, another option to remove quotas is to 
eliminate the quota system in one go. This scenario 
assumes an elimination of quotas in 2013-14 in 
addition to the assumptions of the Luxembourg 
scenario. This scenario is mainly designed to be 
compared to the Soft Landing scenario.  
 
V. SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
We start describing the baseline scenario before 
analysing the impact of the Luxembourg scenario 
relative to the Baseline. We then analyse the quota 
removal scenarios. 
A. Baseline 
In the Baseline, the EU domestic price hardly 
changes (figure 1). Given the high level of support 
prices (for both SMP and Butter) in the baseline, the 
domestic prices of butter and SMP are equal to the 
intervention prices in 2003-04 and stay to be so over 
time. As a result the EU farm milk price does not 
change. The EU utilizes both consumption and 
export subsidies to sustain butter and SMP prices. 
However, the increase in demand allows the EU to 
use less domestic and export subsidies to sustain the 
domestic prices of butter and SMP. At the end of the 
period, the EU no longer utilises subsidies to support 
SMP price. This is because the demand for protein 
in the EU increases over time while the demand for 
fat remains roughly stable. Then SMP price goes up 
and the farm milk price slightly increases. Milk 
quotas are binding in all EU member states. As 
quotas are binding the cost reduction is translated in 
an increase in quota rent but the production does not 
vary. Because the domestic demand gradually 
increases over time and the production remains 
constant, the EU exports decrease over time. This 
explains why world market prices increase. 
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Figure 1: Impact of the Luxembourg reform on raw milk 
prices in EU 25 and in Oceania 
 
B. Luxembourg scenario in the context of a new 
WTO trade agreement 
In the Luxembourg scenario, the EU25 farm milk 
price is significantly affected. Three phases can be 
distinguished: 
• The EU milk price first sharply declines till 
2005-06 in response to the decrease in the 
intervention prices of butter and SMP.  
• Then it remains roughly stable until 2008-
09. A smaller decrease in the intervention 
price and a slight increase in production 
quotas are compensated by the increase in 
domestic demand.   
• It regularly increases afterwards. This is 
because the SMP domestic price is no 
longer at the intervention price. Then the 
increase in demand induces an increase in 
the SMP price which explains the increase 
in farm milk price. 
Thus, the impact on farm milk price of a change 
in the demand for dairy products crucially depends 
on the initial domestic prices of butter and SMP. 
The Luxembourg reform has a small impact on 
farm milk price in Oceania. At the end of the period 
this impact is negative. The increase in EU 
 10 
12th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
production is larger than the increase in its 
consumption generated by the price decrease. Thus, 
as compared to Baseline, the EU exports are larger 
which explains that Oceania milk price shows a 
relative decrease.   
At the end of the period, relative to the baseline, 
the price of butter is significantly lower while the 
price of SMP is significantly higher (Table 5). As 
the baseline shows, without the reform, the EU 
would have utilized subsidies in 2014-15 to sustain 
butter price while she does not use subsidies to 
sustain domestic price of SMP. In the Luxembourg 
scenario, the decrease in the intervention price of 
butter causes the decrease in the domestic price 
which is now equal to the new intervention price. 
This decrease in butter price induces a decrease in 
the milk price as well as a decrease in the price of 
dairy products (cheese, liquid milk). As a result the 
consumption of dairy products increases. This 
means that the demand for protein increases relative 
to the baseline. This in turn causes the price of SMP 
to be higher than in the baseline.  
 
Table 5: Impact of the Luxembourg scenario on dairy 
markets, index 100: Baseline scenario 2014-2015 
  
Farm 
milk Butter SMP WMP 
EU25     
Price 92.4 76.3 104.1 98.4 
Production 101.9 97.6 90.0 152.2 
Exports  18.7 73.3 289.8 
Oceania     
Price 101.0 112.9 100.4 98.4 
  Cheese SHC Fluid milk  
EU25     
Price  96.7 98.0  
Production 101.5 106.0 100.4  
Exports 142.5 272.9   
Oceania     
Price   98.1    
 
Over time the EU production of dairy products is 
more and more oriented towards the production of 
final consumption dairy products. This is at the 
expense of the production of industrial products as 
the global milk production, thanks to the quota 
regime, increases by less than 2 percent. As 
compared to the baseline, the EU production has 
slightly increased due to the quota enlargement 
implied in the Luxembourg Agreement. The EU 
consumption has also increased in response to the 
decrease in dairy product prices. Since the increase 
in production is larger than the increase in domestic 
consumption, the EU still increases her exports to 
the world market, which negatively affects Oceania 
prices and productions.   
The impact of a new potential WTO agreement on 
milk price is quite small. Actually, the additional 
impact of a WTO agreement on milk price depends 
on the magnitude of three effects. First, the 
reduction in tariffs and/or an increase of import 
quotas in importing areas has a positive impact on 
prices as it increases the demand for dairy products 
in the rest of the world. Second, the reduction of EU 
tariffs and the increase of import quotas may have a 
negative impact on domestic prices since it increases 
access to the EU market. Third, by lowering the 
wedge between domestic and world market prices, 
the removal of export subsidies also has a negative 
impact on domestic prices. According to common 
wisdom removing the export subsidies has a strong 
negative impact on EU prices. This is only true, 
however, if export subsidies are needed to support 
prices given the reduction in prices generated by the 
Luxembourg reform. Given the increase in domestic 
demand in the EU and the quota policy, our results 
suggest that under the Luxembourg reform the EU 
will no longer use export subsidies to sustain butter 
and SMP prices in the future. Removing them 
therefore has no market effect. As a result, the 
impact of the new agreement on raw milk prices 
would be small and slightly positive for the EU. 
C. Quota removal, soft landing versus hard landing 
scenario 
When quotas are gradually increased, the farm 
milk price in the EU is roughly stable while in the 
Luxembourg scenario it increased from 2008 to the 
end of the period (Figure 2). In 2014-15, the EU 
milk price drops by 9% compared to the 
Luxembourg scenario.  
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Figure 2: Impact of a soft or hard landing scenario on the 
EU25 and Oceania raw milk price 
 
The drop in price is due to the increase in milk 
production by 3.5%. Both the production and 
exports of dairy commodities increase following the 
increase in milk production while their prices 
decrease (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Impact of the soft landing scenario on dairy 
markets, index 100: Luxembourg scenario 2014-15 
  
Farm 
milk Butter SMP WMP 
EU25     
Price 90.9 85.7 94.8 94.3 
Production 103.5 104.2 105.6 123.1 
Exports  100.0 112.9 142.8 
Oceania     
Price 93.2 97.3 94.7 94.0 
  Cheese SHC 
Fluid 
milk  
EU25     
Price  94.0 95.3  
Production 102.2 105.7 100.9  
Exports 123.6 138.4   
Oceania     
Price   93.6    
 
The price of butter drops more than the price of 
SMP. This is because the EU cannot export more 
butter without subsidies on the world market. As a 
consequence the additional butter production needs 
to be consumed in the EU. This can only be 
achieved by a significant drop in the butter price. On 
the contrary the increase in SMP production is 
absorbed by a higher EU consumption as well as 
through an increase in EU exports. Because EU 
exports increase, the world market price for dairy 
products will go down by 3 to 6 percent depending 
on the product. This has a negative impact on the 
farm milk price in Oceania, which drops by 7 
percent.  
 
Table 7: Impact of the hard landing scenario on dairy 
markets, index 100: Luxembourg scenario 2014-15 
  
Farm 
milk Butter SMP WMP 
EU25     
Price 87.5 80.7 93.1 92.5 
Production 104.6 105.6 108.0 132.7 
Exports  100.0 119.3 160.7 
Oceania     
Price 91.3 96.6 93.0 92.0 
  Cheese SHC 
Fluid 
milk  
EU25     
Price  91.4 93.5  
Production 102.6 106.6 101.2  
Exports 126.5 142.7   
Oceania     
Price   92.2    
 
 
With a complete quota removal, the reduction in 
milk price is higher due to a larger increase in 
production. Actually, in 2013, the EU increases its 
production by 4.6% by removing the quota system.  
This 1% additional increase in production explains 
the additional 3% drop in the EU milk price. This 
also suggests that in the soft landing scenario, fully 
removing quota in 2014-15 would not provoke a 
large dramatic change in dairy market equilibrium.  
The main difference between soft landing and 
hard landing is then mainly in the transition phase. 
Because changes are smoother in the soft landing 
case, this scenario is better from an industry point of 
view. Thus, the time evolution of capacities of 
production might be easier to manage.  
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D. Impact on producers surplus 
As compared to the baseline scenario, in the 
Luxembourg scenario in 2014-15, producers gain 
1.3 billion €, whereas in the same year they lose 2.6 
billion € in the soft landing scenario (Table 8). As 
the scenarios show very different evolutions of 
prices, the average gains or losses over the period 
2004-2014 significantly differ from the numbers 
given for the year 2014-15. As such the direct 
payments are more than sufficient to compensate 
producer for the loss of producer surplus in the 
Luxembourg scenario, but fall short to achieve full 
compensation in the soft landing scenario.  
 
Table 8: Impact of the reforms on EU-25 producer 
surplus (billion €) 
*Average: the annual change is the net present value calculated using an 
interest rate of 4% in real term. 
** Direct payments are evaluated including the modulation.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Luxembourg Agreement (while taking into 
account a new WTO agreement following the 
Falconer proposal) leads in 2014-15 to a nearly 8 
percent decrease in the EU milk price as compared 
to a baseline representing the pré-Luxembourg 
status quo. For some years the price decline might 
even be larger. 
As compared to the Luxembourg scenario, 
gradually phasing out milk quota (soft landing) 
implies a significant further milk price decline (-
9%). This is due to the predicted increase in EU 
milk production by about four percent. The 
expansion of EU milk production will lead to 
significant increases in EU net exports to the world 
market, which in turn will create a strong downward 
pressure on world market prices. Over time prices 
show a smooth and stable pattern in this scenario. 
The hard landing scenario led to a 12 percent milk 
price decline. This goes parallel with an expansion 
of EU milk production by 4.6 percent. The 1 percent 
additional milk production as compared to the soft 
landing scenario, suggests that fully removing the 
quota in 2014-15 in the latter scenario is not likely 
to provoke a large dramatic change in the dairy 
market equilibrium. 
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